Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy coordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary.

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Year of publication:	2003-09-01
Authors:	Catenaro, Marco ; Vidal, Jean-Pierre
Publisher:	European Central Bank
Subject:	EU-Staaten \| EU countries \| EU-Steuerrecht \| EU tax law \| Kapitalertragsteuer \| Capital income tax \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Steuerwettbewerb \| Tax competition \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	271360 bytes 22 p. application/pdf
Series:	Working paper series / European Central Bank ; 259
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; H87 - International Fiscal Issues ; Tax Policy ; Tax Law ; EU ; Taxation. Fiscal policy ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints
Source:	ArchiDok

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009635918