Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil |
Publisher: |
Uppsala : Uppsala University, Department of Economics |
Subject: | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Arbeitsuche | Ökonomischer Anreiz | Theorie | Unemployment insurance | search | monitoring | sactions | workfare |
Series: | Working Paper ; 2003:10 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 363288147 [GVK] hdl:10419/82735 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2003_010 [RePEc] |
Classification: | J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings ; J68 - Public Policy |
Source: |
-
Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions
Boone, Jan, (2001)
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium
Fredriksson, Peter, (1998)
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