Incentive compatible cost sharing of a coalition initiative with probabilistic inspection and penalties for misrepresentation
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Caballero, William N. ; Lunday, Brian J. ; Ahner, Darryl K. |
Published in: |
Group decision and negotiation. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1572-9907, ZDB-ID 1478683-7. - Vol. 29.2020, 6, p. 1021-1055
|
Subject: | Cost sharing | Multiobjective optimization | Mechanism design | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Kosten | Costs | Koalition | Coalition | Strafe | Punishment | Multikriterielle Entscheidungsanalyse | Multi-criteria analysis | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Selbstbeteiligung | Deductible | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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