Incentive contracting when boards have related industry expertise
Year of publication: |
December 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Nanda, Vikram ; Onal, Bunyamin |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 41.2016, p. 1-22
|
Subject: | Boards | Related industries | CEO compensation | Pay-performance sensitivity | CEO turnovers | Pay for industry performance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vorstand | Executive board | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Industrie | Manufacturing industries |
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