Incentives dominate selection : chamber-changing legislators are driven by electoral rules and voter preferences
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Portmann, Marco ; Stadelmann, David ; Eichenberger, Reiner |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 193.2022, p. 353-366
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Subject: | Preference representation | Incentives | Electoral systems | Voting | Responsiveness | Legislative behavior | Electoral connection | Wahlsystem | Electoral system | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Abstimmung | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy |
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