Incentives dominate selection: Chamber-changing legislators are driven by electoral rules and voter preferences
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Portmann, Marco ; Stadelmann, David ; Eichenberger, Reiner |
Publisher: |
Kiel, Hamburg : ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |
Subject: | Preference representation | elections | incentives | electoral systems | voting | political presentation | responsiveness | legislative behavior | electoral connection. |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Conference Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1733548459 [GVK] hdl:10419/203559 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:vfsc19:203559 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; P16 - Political Economy |
Source: |
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Portmann, Marco, (2019)
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Portmann, Marco, (2022)
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Partisan Liberalizations. A New Puzzle from OECD Network Industries?.
BELLOC, FILIPPO, (2010)
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Stadelmann, David, (2011)
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Evaluating the Median Voter Model’s Explanatory Power
Stadelmann, David, (2011)
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Quantifying Parliamentary Representation of Constituents' Preferences with Quasi-Experimental Data
Stadelmann, David, (2011)
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