Incentives in optimally sized teams for projects with uncertain returns
Oliver Dürr, Markus Nisch, Anna Rohlfing-Bastian
| Year of publication: |
2020
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Dürr, Oliver ; Nisch, Markus ; Rohlfing-Bastian, Anna |
| Published in: |
Review of accounting studies. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1573-7136, ZDB-ID 2004326-0. - Vol. 25.2020, 1, p. 313-341
|
| Subject: | Incentive contracts | Uncertainty | Team size | Monitoring | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risiko | Risk | Projektmanagement | Project management | Anreiz | Incentives | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Betriebsgröße | Firm size |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s11142-019-09529-5 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012231033