Incentives, team production, transactions costs, and the optimal contract : estimates of an agency model using payroll records
Year of publication: |
1994
|
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Authors: | Ferrall, Christopher |
Other Persons: | Shearer, Bruce S. (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Kingston, Ontario : Inst. for Economic Research, Queens Univ. |
Subject: | Transaktionskosten | Transaction costs | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Vertrag | Contract |
Extent: | 50 S. graph. Darst. |
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Series: | Discussion paper / Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University. - Kingston, Ontario, ISSN 0316-5078, ZDB-ID 863062-8. - Vol. 908 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Literaturverz. S. 48 - 50 |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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