Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties : punishment or rent extraction?
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 224.2023, p. 1-4
|
Subject: | Moral hazard | Limited liability | Hidden action | Incentive contracts | Job design | Moral Hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Beschränkte Haftung | Anreiz | Incentives | Strafe | Punishment | Arbeitsgestaltung |
-
Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties : punishment or rent extraction?
Schmitz, Patrick W., (2023)
-
Three essays on information and incentives
Bierbaum, Jürgen, (2003)
-
Optimal marginal deterrence and incentives for precaution
Thomas, Lionel, (2015)
- More ...
-
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?
Oechssler, Jörg, (2008)
-
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods?
Schmitz, Patrick W., (2024)
-
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem
Schmitz, Patrick W., (2002)
- More ...