Incomplete contracts and competition: another look at fisher body/general motors?

In this paper we analyze the problem of the enforcement of incomplete contracts with endogenous outside options. Some of the equilibria we outline may reverse one of the main results presented in the standard literature. We then revisit the literature on the highly debated Fisher Body/General Motors merger and suggest an explanation based on GM’s need to control the Fisher brothers’ outside options. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Nicita, Antonio ; Sepe, Simone
Published in:	European Journal of Law and Economics. - Springer, ISSN 0929-1261. - Vol. 34.2012, 3, p. 495-514
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Incomplete contracts \| Hold-up problem \| Transaction costs \| Endogenous outside options \| Cross competition \| Vertical integration

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010863251