Incomplete contracts and employee opportunism : how Machiavellianism moderates the effects of impacting an uncompensated objective
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Brown, Timothy J. ; Majors, Tracie M. ; Vance, Thomas |
Published in: |
Journal of management accounting research : JMAR. - Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., ISSN 1049-2127, ZDB-ID 1101530-5. - Vol. 33.2021, 2, p. 1-18
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Subject: | organizational objectives | Machiavellianism | stewardship | psychological ownership | justice | opportunism | budget slack | incomplete contracts | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Verhalten in Organisationen | Organizational behaviour | Theorie | Theory | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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