Incomplete contracts as a screening device in competing vertical inter-firm relationships
Marta Sicoli; Marco M. Sorge
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Sicoli, Marta ; Sorge, Marco M. |
| Published in: |
Revue d'économie industrielle. - Liège : De Boeck, ISSN 0154-3229, ZDB-ID 420834-1. - Vol. 147.2014, 3, p. 141-181
|
| Subject: | Vertically Integrated Firms | Asymmetric Information | Incomplete Contracts | Screening | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Signalling |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Zsfassung in franz. Sprache |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010425493