Incorporating rigidity and commitment in the timing structure of macroeconomic games
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Libich, Jan ; Stehlík, Petr |
Published in: |
Economic modelling. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0264-9993, ZDB-ID 86824-3. - Vol. 27.2010, 3, p. 767-781
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Subject: | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Zeitkonsistenz | Time consistency | Inflationssteuerung | Inflation targeting | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Theorie | Theory |
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