Increased auditor independence by external rotation and seperating audit and non audit duties? : a note on the European audit regulation
Patrick Velte; Marc Eulerich
| Year of publication: |
2014
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Velte, Patrick ; Eulerich, Marc |
| Published in: |
Corporate ownership & control : international scientific journal. - Sumy : Virtus Interpress, ISSN 1727-9232, ZDB-ID 2472114-1. - Vol. 11.2013/14, 4, p. 96-106
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| Subject: | low balling | audit quality | empirical audit research | auditor independence | rotation | audit market concentration | consulting | audit fees | principal agent theory | expectation gap | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Abschlussprüferrecht | Audit regulation | Dienstleistungsqualität | Service quality | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Jahresabschlussprüfung | Financial statement audit | Honorar | Fee (Remuneration) | Regulierung | Regulation |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338953