INCUMBENTS, CHALLENGERS, AND BANDITS: BAYESIAN LEARNING IN A DYNAMIC CHOICE MODEL.
Year of publication: |
1990
|
---|---|
Authors: | BANKS, J.S. ; SUNDARAM, R.K. |
Institutions: | University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) |
Subject: | uncertainty | information | game theory | economic models |
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