Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies

In this paper I prove that in the standard model of 2 times n (n >= 2) pure exchange economies there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient, non-inversely-dictatorial, and strategy-proof. This strengthens two previous results on this subject by Hurwicz and by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin.

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Year of publication:	1990-09
Authors:	Zhou, Lin
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	CFP 793. Published in Social Choice and Welfare (1991), 8: 247-254 The price is None Number 954 11 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762614