Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions

I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a continuum of inefficient undominated ex-post equilibria. The result extends for the generalized VCG mechanism, Dasgupta-Maskin auction and, generally, for every auction that has an efficient ex-post equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Birulin, Oleksii
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 22.2003, 3, p. 675-683
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Auction \| VCG mechnism \| Ex-post equilibrium \| Efficiency

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753376