Inefficient National Environmental Regulation as a Signal of High Abatement Costs.

This paper analyses the importance of informational asymmetries in international environmental regulation by use of a game theoretic approach of signalling games.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Steiner, U.
Institutions:	Nationalökonomisk Institut, Institut for Økonomi
Subject:	ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

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Series:	Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	28 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; Q20 - Renewable Resources and Conservation; Environmental Management. General ; F30 - International Finance. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005780984