Influential independent directors' reputation incentives : impacts on CEO compensation contracts and financial reporting
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Masulis, Ronald W. ; Mobbs, Shawn |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 82.2023, p. 1-36
|
Subject: | CEO compensation | Earnings management | Independent directors | Reputation incentives | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Reputation | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vorstand | Executive board | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance |
-
Velte, Patrick, (2020)
-
Managerial compensation as a double-edged sword : optimal incentives under misreporting
Loyola, Gino, (2020)
-
Pott, Christiane, (2014)
- More ...
-
Independent director incentives : where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?
Masulis, Ronald W., (2014)
-
Are all inside directors the same? : evidence from the external directorship market
Masulis, Ronald W., (2011)
-
Independent Director Incentives : Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy?
Masulis, Ronald W., (2013)
- More ...