• Abstract
  • Non-technical summary
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Strategic voting versus naive voting
  • 2.1 Sincere voting
  • 2.2 Abstention
  • 2.3 Unanimity
  • 3 Incentives for information acquisition
  • 3.1 Large committees
  • 3.2 The case for small committees
  • 3.3 Relation to the delegating authority
  • 4 Conflicting interests
  • 4.1 Caring differently about mistakes
  • 4.2 Binary decisions and continuous information
  • 4.3 Committee size with conflicting preferences
  • 4.4 Decision rules with interdependent preferences
  • 5 Communication
  • 5.1 Irrelevance of voting rules
  • 5.2 Imperfect aggregation and incentives
  • 5.3 Communication and conflicting interests
  • 6 Decision skills
  • 7 Experimental results
  • 8 Summary of theoretical results
  • 8.1 How large should a committee be?
  • 8.2 Who should be in a committee?
  • 8.3 What is the optimal decision rule?
  • 9 Implications for Monetary Policy Committees
  • 9.1 Why monetary policy committees?
  • 9.2 The optimal size of a committee
  • 9.3 The voting rule
  • 9.4 Who should be in a committee?
  • 9.5 Relation to the outside
  • References