Information and preference aggregation

We investigate the implications of relaxing Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom while retaining transitivity and the Pareto condition. Even a small relaxation opens a floodgate of possibilities for nondictatorial and efficient social choice.

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Year of publication:	1999-11-15
Authors:	Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S.
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 17.2000, 1, p. 3-24
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 20 August 1997/Accepted: 29 September 1998
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369487