Information design in multi-stage games

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Makris, Miltiadis ; Renou, Ludovic
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 18.2023, 4, p. 1475-1509
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Bayes' correlated equilibrium \| communication equilibrium \| information design \| information structures \| Multistage games \| revelation principle \| sequential communication equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE4769 [DOI] 1876215240 [GVK] RePEc:the:publsh:4769 [RePEc]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537039