Information design in multistage games

Miltiadis Makris, Ludovic Renou

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Makrēs, Miltiadēs ; Renou, Ludovic
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 18.2023, 4, p. 1475-1509
Subject:	Bayes' correlated equilibrium \| communication equilibrium \| information design \| information structures \| Multistage games \| revelation principle \| sequential communication equilibrium \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Kommunikation \| Communication \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE4769 [DOI] hdl:10419/296445 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440070