Information revelation in procurement auctions: an equivalence result

Procurement auctions often involve quality considerations as a determinant of the final outcome. When qualities are the procurer’s private information then various information policies may be used to affect the expected outcome. For auctions with two cost heterogeneous suppliers, this work defines a notion of duality between pairs of policies, and shows that dual policies are revenue equivalent.

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Year of publication:	2012-10
Authors:	Colucci, Domenico ; Doni, Nicola ; Valori, Vincenzo
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, Università degli Studi di Firenze
Subject:	procurement \| information revelation \| discriminatory policy \| asymmetric auctions

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers - Mathematical Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2012-07 8 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734985