Information revelation in repeated delegation
Year of publication: |
1993
|
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Authors: | Legros, Patrick |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 5.1993, 1, p. 98-117
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Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Stellvertretung | Proxy | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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