Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: a model for the selection and use of biased expert advice
| Year of publication: |
December 2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Plott, Charles ; Llewellyn, Morgan |
| Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 40.2015, 2, p. 208-223
|
| Subject: | Cheap talk | Committee experts | Expert biases | Experiments | Majority rule | Information aggregation | Experten | Experts | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Aggregation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Systematischer Fehler | Bias | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Experiment | Entscheidung | Decision |
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