Information Transmission and Preference Similarity.

This paper examines sets of Nash equilibrium in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In partial common interest games they contain only informative equilibria.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Blume, A.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	27 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233336