Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Rosenberg, Dinah ; Solan, Eilon ; Vieille, Nicolas |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 66.2009, 2, p. 979-994
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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