Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Congleton, Roger |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 132.2007, 3, p. 333-352
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Jury theorem | Rational ignorance | Elections | Delegation | Expert’s dilemma | Information aggregation | Yardstick competition | Informational policies | Liberal institutions | Effectiveness of democracy | Majority rule | Simulated elections |
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