Informational rents and the excessive entry theorem : the case of hidden action
Marco de Pinto, Laszlo Goerke, Alberto Palermo
| Year of publication: |
2024
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| Authors: | De Pinto, Marco ; Goerke, Laszlo ; Palermo, Alberto |
| Published in: |
Scottish journal of political economy : the journal of the Scottish Economic Society. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1467-9485, ZDB-ID 1473829-6. - Vol. 71.2024, 2, p. 237-252
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| Subject: | excessive entry | informational rents | moral hazard | oligopoly | Markteintritt | Market entry | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Ökonomische Rente | Economic rent | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1111/sjpe.12371 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536385