Informed-Principal Problem in Mechanisms with Limited Commitment

This paper studies mechanism design with limited commitment where agents have correlated persistent types over the infinite horizon. The mechanism designer now faces the informed-principal problem in addition to usual issues with i.i.d. types. The paper first shows revelation principle in this context then shows sufficient conditions for obtaining full-commitment solutions with limited commitment.

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Kwon, Suehyun
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	mechanism design \| limited commitment \| revelation principle \| informed-principal problem \| persistence \| correlated types

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 7513
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1049588169 [GVK] hdl:10419/198873 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_7513 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018204