Initial compensation contracts for new executives and financial distress risk : an empirical investigation of UK firms
Year of publication: |
February 2018
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Authors: | Chen, Jie ; De Cesari, Amedeo ; Hill, Paula ; Ozkan, Neslihan |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 48.2018, p. 292-313
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Subject: | Executive compensation | Financial distress risk | Creditor monitoring | Führungskräfte | Managers | Insolvenz | Insolvency | Managervergütung | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Großbritannien | United Kingdom | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Aktienoption | Stock option | Risiko | Risk |
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