Innovation and antibiotic use within antibiotic classes: Market incentives and economic instruments

We analyze a monopolist's incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time- and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Herrmann, Markus ; Nkuiya, Bruno ; Dussault, Anne-Renée
Published in:	Resource and Energy Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0928-7655. - Vol. 35.2013, 4, p. 582-598
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Economics of antibiotic resistance \| Antibiotic innovation \| Monopoly \| Generic industry \| Social optimum \| Economic instruments

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D42 - Monopoly ; I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Q38 - Government Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719068