Innovation and Antibiotic Use within Antibiotic Classes: Market Incentives and Economic Instruments

We analyze a monopolist’s incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Herrmann, Markus ; Nkuiya, Bruno ; Dussault, Anne-Renée
Institutions:	Centre de recherche en économie de l'environnement, de l'agroalimentaire, des transports et de l'énergie (CREATE), Université Laval
Subject:	Economics of antibiotic resistance \| antibiotic innovation \| monopoly \| generic industry \| social optimum \| economic instruments

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche CREATE.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D42 - Monopoly ; I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Q38 - Government Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776424