Innovation and Antibiotic Use Within Antibiotic Classes : Market Incentives and Economic Instruments

We analyze a monopolist’s incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Herrmann, Markus ; Nkuiya, Bruno ; Dussault, Anne-Renée
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Innovation \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Antibiotika \| Antibiotics \| Arzneimittel \| Pharmaceuticals \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (33 p)
Series:	CREATE working paper serie ; 2013-3
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 1, 2013 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3262241 [DOI]
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D42 - Monopoly ; I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Q38 - Government Policy
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014110897