Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange

We examine the effect of insecure property and its accompanying enforcement costs on the efficiency of exchange. Because of the large enforcement costs that may be induced by the expectation of exchange, limited settlement without exchange may be "ex ante" superior for an adversary or even Pareto dominant. We therefore show how the removal of restrictions on exchange and the development of secure property are related. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Skaperdas, Stergios ; Syropoulos, Constantinos
Published in:	Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 112.2002, 476, p. 133-146
Publisher:	Royal Economic Society - RES

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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