Inside directors and the underinvestment of financial slack towards R&D-intensity in high-technology firms
Ibrahim A. Shaikh, Jonathan Paul O'Brien, Lois Peters
| Year of publication: |
January 2018
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Shaikh, Ibrahim A. ; O'Brien, Jonathan ; Peters, Lois S. |
| Published in: |
Journal of business research : JBR. - New York, NY : Elsevier, ISSN 0148-2963, ZDB-ID 189773-1. - Vol. 82.2018, p. 192-201
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| Subject: | Agency theory | Distress | Financial slack | Inside directors | R&D-intensity | Underinvestment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Hochtechnologie | High technology | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vorstand | Executive board | Insiderhandel | Insider trading | Industrieforschung | Industrial research | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.09.014 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771847