Instability of Equilibria with Private Monitoring

Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. I present a mild refinement that requires robustness against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents, and I show that only defection satisfies this refinement among all the existing equilibria in the literature.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015-12-20
Authors:	Heller, Yuval

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Heller, Yuval (2015): Instability of Equilibria with Private Monitoring.
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015250207