Instant Exit from the War of Attrition.

This paper takes a new look at the classic concession game. It argues that exit from an asymmetric war of attrition is likely to be instant. Selecting a unique equilibrium using a "craziness" pertubation device, it finds a notion of stochastic strength determines the outcome, with a stochastically weaker player giving up immediately.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Myatt, D.P.
Institutions:	Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford
Subject:	GAME THEORY

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Series:	Economics Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	17 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730295