Institutional Owners and the Return on Investments
Examining a large number of Swedish listed firms, this paper analyses how institutional owners affects the investment decisions and firm performance. During the last decades the ownership structure of Swedish firms has undergone dramatic changes: institutional and foreign investors have been increasing their stakes, whereas Swedish households have decreased in importance. Controlling owners, often founding families, remain in control by resorting to an extensive use of dual-class shares. To measure investment performance Mueller and Reardon’s (1993) marginal q is used. Marginal q measures the ratio of the return on investments to the cost of capital. We find that institutional and foreign owners positively influence the performance of firms. Furthermore a non-liner relation between ownership concentration and performance is found. This is consistent with positive incentive effects and negative entrenchment effects. The practice of dual-class shares which separate cash-flow rights and control rights is also found to be an important determinant of firm performance.
The text is part of a series KTH/CESIS Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation Number 96 31 pages
Classification:
C23 - Models with Panel Data ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; K22 - Corporation and Securities Law ; L25 - Firm Size and Performance