Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages

The purpose of this note is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages. The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Vasilev, Aleksandar
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance. - Craiova : ASERS, ISSN 2458-0813. - Vol. 5.2019, 2, p. 1-9
Publisher:	Craiova : ASERS
Subject:	indivisible labor \| lotteries \| unobservable effort \| fair wages \| insurance

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.14505/jmef.v5.2(9).01 [DOI] hdl:10419/218943 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:espost:218943 [RePEc]
Classification:	J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012224666