Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we study the political economy of the inter-regional allocation of investment in infrastructure, in an effort to disentangle tactical and programmatic motives, where tactical politics refers to the discretionary allocation of investment to districts with more ‘political clout’ and programmatic politics refers to the allocation of investment according to certain ‘objective’ criteria (e.g., income level). We use a panel of data from the Spanish electoral districts for the period 1964–2004 to estimate an equation in which investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since the districts receiving the most funds are those in which: (i) the incumbent’s vote margin is low, (ii) few votes are needed to win an additional seat in the legislature, (iii) the central and regional governments are controlled by the same party, and (iv) regional parties play a pivotal role in the legislature. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution is shown to increase: (i) with the arrival of democracy and European Union funds, (ii) under leftist governments, and (iii) the weaker the correlation is between ‘political clout’ and regional income. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013