Interacting mechanisms : a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems

Françoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler, Andrés Salamanca

Year of publication:	2024
Authors:	Forges, Françoise ; Koessler, Frédéric ; Salamanca, Andrés
Subject:	Communication equilibrium \| Corporations \| Correlated equilibrium \| Mechanism design \| Multiple principals \| Perfect Bayesian equilibrium \| Revelation principle \| Robust equilibrium \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103023 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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