Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction.

The authors provide an epistemic analysis of forward induction in games with complete and incomplete information. They suggest that forward induction may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Battigalli, P. ; Siniscalchi, M.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, European University Institute
Subject:	INFORMATION \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	56 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005816407