Internal vs. core coalitional stability in the environmental externality game: A reconciliation
Year of publication: |
2014-11-30
|
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Authors: | Tulkens, Henry |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | environmental externalities | game theory | coalitions | core | internal stability |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2014058 |
Classification: | C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; H4 - Publicly Provided Goods ; H87 - International Fiscal Issues ; Q5 - Environmental Economics |
Source: |
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