International Treaties on Global Pollution: a Dynamic Time-Path Analysis.

In this paper we show that the formation of coalitions by subsets of countries might diminish the likelihood of a successful world-wide treaty on global pollution. Non-member countries may be less willing to sign a world-wide treaty than they would be in the absence of such coalitions. In fact, the coalition formation may raise the reservation utility of non-member countries above the world-wide treaty level and thus take away their incentives to sign it.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Chander, P.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	ECONOMIC INTEGRATION \| TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION CENTER FOR OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND ECONOMETRICS (C.O.R.E.) \| LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE BELGIQUE. 11p

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	F15 - Economic Integration ; F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business ; Q28 - Government Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005633997