Intertemporal aggregation and incentives
Intertemporal aggregation results in a summarization of information and a natural delay in the release of information. We study a principal-agent model and show that intertemporal aggregation can be an optimal feature of a performance evaluation system. We then highlight subtleties associated with valuing additional information as the level of aggregation of existing information is varied.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Arya, Anil ; Glover, Jonathan ; Liang, Pierre Jinghong |
Published in: |
European Accounting Review. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 0963-8180. - Vol. 13.2004, 4, p. 643-657
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Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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