Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules

Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs [Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fur Operations Research, 31 (1987), A 143 { A 159] that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Brânzei, R. ; Dall'Aglio, M. ; Tijs, S.H.
Institutions:	Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Subject:	cooperative games \| interval data \| bankruptcy problems

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series CentER Discussion Paper Number 2008-97
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091214