Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate

In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite two-person zero-sum games.

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Year of publication:	2005-09-22
Authors:	Carpente, Luisa ; Casas-Mendez, Balbina ; Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio ; van den Nouweland, Anne
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Oregon
Subject:	Strategic Games \| Coalitional Interval Games \| Superadditive Games \| Axiomatic Characterization

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	3 pages long
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464113