Invariably suboptimal : an attempt to improve the voting rules of the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon
Werner Kirsch; Jessica Langner
| Year of publication: |
2011
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Kirsch, Werner ; Langner, Jessica |
| Published in: |
Journal of common market studies : JCMS. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0021-9886, ZDB-ID 3008-9. - Vol. 49.2011, 6, p. 1317-1338
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| Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | EU-Staaten | EU countries | Theorie | Theory | EU-Mitgliedschaft | EU membership | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Vertrag von Nizza | Vertrag von Lissabon <2007 Dezember 13> | Wahlsystem |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015102213